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The dispossessed are a class always increasing in numbers.
“So desirous are the poor of Europe to get to America, where they may better their condition, that, being unable to pay their passage, they will agree to serve two or three years on their arrival there, rather than not go. During the time of that service they are better fed, better clothed, and have lighter labour than while in Europe. Continuing to work for hire a few years longer, they buy a farm, marry, and enjoy all the sweets of a domestic society of their own.”
– Thomas Jefferson [1]
The nationalist and “fascist” project is often slated by our movement as a mythic force, reflecting upon an empty past. We have done as much, for there is simple truth to this: every nation requires a spiritual claim, which it can valorize and permeate to the ends of the State’s hard and soft borders. Each generation needs yet another heap of territorial remarks, nonsensical tales of military leaders’ sweet-toothes and appetites for sex. We need mythological substance. For without such inclinations there would be no subsuming struggle to retain democracy and its relics in the new century, let alone spread it to the undemocratic savages of the rest of the world.
Yet, we cannot claim this is entirely such. America, the United States of America, is a cruel and captivating machination of capital, which has grounded itself sufficiently upon utopian pre-capitalist formations. The American dream was immediately propertied, even if it no longer exists due to a lack of such at the producers’ disposal. It can be said that the invention of the kibbutz was its mere hapless child, that it had tipped off Hitler to an alternative method of rather primitive accumulation in Eastern Europe, and so on and so forth. The Zionist settlers, the National Socialists, and European colonists in America have one point of agreement upon which we rest our argument: they were indeed the real Socialists, the most glowing examples for the world to see. In many ways the end goal of such social accumulation, much to the rue of the bourgeoisie, was to circumvent and integrate masses of propertied settlers who answer to no one.
When American nationalists, sycophants and otherwise bloodthirsty sociopaths point to the jewel of America’s great past, they are yearning for something that is both tangible and real: property. Ironically, the stories of genocide and conquering are all but wrapping paper over a movement against capitalist degradation, the very first on our beloved continent. What we hope to address is thus the changing class composition of an American settler society–primarily of small producers and owners–increasingly frayed by its dispossession and reorganization. Here, we will focus on the social history of colonial producers and their petit-bourgeois offspring specifically, rather than the labor aristocracy at large.
A Summation of Burgeoning American Capital
America’s distinct path of development rests upon the implications of the most bountiful colonial project in existence, one which had little feudal imprint and juristic State, or basis for capital to form. Not for the fact there were no means of production to harness, but rather that the means were so bountiful and extensive, and there was no enforcement of domain bold enough to challenge its accumulation. Thus there was no immediate construction of an imported proletariat.
“We have seen that the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the basis of the capitalist mode of production. The essence of a free colony, on the contrary, consists in this – that the bulk of the soil is still public property, and every settler on it therefore can turn part of it into his private property and individual means of production, without hindering the later settlers in the same operation. This is the secret both of the prosperity of the colonies and of their inveterate vice – opposition to the establishment of capital.” [2]
This opposition to capital was expressed despite its intensification on the European bourgeoisie’s part, and even as more Europeans arrived throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries to meet these needs. Circulating back to Jefferson, we can begin to understand the social conditions which have formed these rather nascent pockets of nostalgia. Wealth and property, even when not immediate, could be accumulated in such a short while that no monstrous proletariat could form. No bulky White mass would till the soil without a grand compromise. Bounty could be sold off in a handful of years to a European laborer or servant who worked the land in raw obedience, whereas otherwise in Europe he had no prospects beyond misery. Thus the labor market itself was shattered, asthmatic in its attempts to catch up, causing the labor-power that was contracted out to sell for a premium. So while we can understand the advertisements of Jefferson as a flowery brochure of nationalist seduction, they were altogether accurate in depicting the colonial class structure.
“The absolute population here increases much more quickly than in the mothercountry, because many labourers enter this world as ready-made adults, and yet the labour-market is always understocked. The law of supply and demand of labour falls to pieces. On the one hand, the old world constantly throws in capital, thirsting after exploitation and “abstinence”; on the other, the regular reproduction of the wage labourer as wage labourer comes into collision with impediments the most impertinent and in part invincible. What becomes of the production of wage-labourers, supernumerary in proportion to the accumulation of capital? The wage-worker of to-day is to-morrow an independent peasant, or artisan, working for himself. He vanishes from the labour-market, but not into the workhouse. This constant transformation of the wage-labourers into independent producers, who work for themselves instead of for capital, and enrich themselves instead of the capitalist gentry, reacts in its turn very perversely on the conditions of the labour-market.”
(Marx, 1867)
As such, the American project’s transhumanist fondness can be characterized similar to nostalgia for the early regimes of the Church: that there was no proletarian misery, for there was no proletarian condition. What subsequently unfolded was a struggle between the landed small producers and capital of both European and eventually American forms, resulting in the overthrow of British rule, and the captivating rise of a new financial aristocracy. These conditions over two centuries–of course including the land grabs and transportation networks to process and ship commodities–created the opportunity for industrial monopoly capital to accumulate, and they attracted millions more of Europe’s poorest sons and daughters. Nearly 12 million arrived between 1870-1900, mainly Germans and Irish, before Southern and Eastern Europeans met the demand for industrial labor at the turn of the century. [3] At the time of Marx, this of course brought wages down significantly–though still much higher than their European counterparts–and initiated the process that would erode small ownership.
“On the one hand, the enormous and ceaseless stream of men, year after year driven upon America, leaves behind a stationary sediment in the east of the United States, the wave of immigration from Europe throwing men on the labour-market there more rapidly than the wave of emigration westwards can wash them away. On the other hand, the American Civil War brought in its train a colossal national debt, and, with it, pressure of taxes, the rise of the vilest financial aristocracy, the squandering of a huge part of the public land on speculative companies for the exploitation of railways, mines, &c., in brief, the most rapid centralisation of capital. The great republic has, therefore, ceased to be the promised land for emigrant labourers. Capitalistic production advances there with giant strides, even though the lowering of wages and the dependence of the wage-worker are yet far from being brought down to the normal European level.” (Marx, 1867)
At this slow grinding of divine right, much of the established work force was still rural. Regarding America during the Civil War, for example: “The contest waged between 1861 and 1865 was between two versions of agrarianism, between the free-labor family farm and the slave labor cotton plantation”, where “free labor” practices in the North encouraged urban developments, but still dictated roughly 70% of its population to agrarian work, whereas the South’s chattel-slave model was roughly 85-90% rural, as it oversaw a lack of demand for supportive urban centers.[4,5] Specifically in the South, demand for labor, both urban and rural, cemented the petit bourgeois class positioning. As demand for labor grew, so did the practice of slave renting. Through the renting out of slave labor, often for short periods of time, small farmers were able to consolidate their place in society as the ever illustrious yeoman farmer that Jefferson dreamed of, while not having to participate in the actual labor process. Likewise in the burgeoning urban areas, rented slave labor was used to bolster the, relatively low, industrialized workforce. [6]
Later urbanization and monopolization went hand in hand, to push demand for labor to a few critical centers, driving both migrants there as well as the attention of the settled and propertied, whose labor became of assistance to rising behemoths of metropolitan localities. Thus the raw hunger for labor power captivated another 15 million Europeans between 1900-1915, as the United States had finally become an urban-industrial powerhouse.[7] The basis for Jacksonian populism sufficiently mutilated, the early 1900s can be described as the real death knell of the “Special Period” of American Dreaming. As more migrant laborers washed upon the shores, capital as a social relation was solidified, and small agrarian ownership became, in many circumstances, petit-bourgeois ownership. Formal democracy took its place, enlisting subservience beyond the basis of sole proprietorship and to the accomplished nation-state.
“The petty-bourgeois democracy of old, based on a certain equality among the citizens of small agricultural or artisanal collectivities, [had] given way under monopoly capitalism to a purely formal “democracy,” the mass of citizens being only a vast “market” to which the monopolists “sell” ideas as they sell automobiles and toothpaste.” [8]
Over a 90 year period (1880-1970) their presence declined from 41.8% to 9.5% of the total laboring population. [9]
As Marx and almost every serious communist in the generation proceeding has declared, the petit-bourgeois was a doomed man. Nothing would unite the historical Lenin and Kautsky, following the latter’s Great Betrayal, quite like this synoptic. And for what it’s worth, monopolist urbanization cost the small owners from their ranks nearly a third of the total labor force. Yet in the United States–and to an extent across Western Europe–we see the gradual proletarianization of the petit-bourgeois as a remnant of often rural, colonial economies, defined by a more recent upturn in their fortunes towards the end of the 20th century.
“On the basis of the best available time series, it appears that between 1940 and 1973 there was a virtually monotonic annual decline in the rate of self-employment in the United States, from around 20% to under 10%; from 1973 to 1976 the self-employment rate was basically stable, but since then [1976-1989] there has been a slight but steady increase in the rate of self-employment.” (Steinmetz & Wright, 1989)
This outgrowth–small ownership rose to about 12% of the American labor force at its peak–was aided by Ronald Reagan’s U.S. Self-Employment Act of 1985, a start-up scheme for unemployed and lumpenproletariat to operate small businesses of their own. Touted as a bastion of free labor practices and American ingenuity, this Act and its solidification only served to grasp at straws in the midst of outstretched globalization. It produced a sentient, heady blue-collar class above the proletariat who often labored just like them. They would help diminish union strength in a bargain for greater mobility around projects, and the varying tax break schemes American society has come to offer them.
“Empirical studies of the contemporary United States and Britain indicate an increased reliance by employers on sweatshops, subcontracting, and out-sourcing (Such strategies raise nominal self-employment rates, but much of the apparent expansion represents changes in systems of classification of particular jobs rather than a genuine expansion of self-employment properly understood… A third of the formally self-employed workers in the construction industry worked exclusively for contractors and provided only their own labor. In such cases there is really very little to distinguish them from wage workers… Moreover, significant sections of the welfare state and community development and employment programs have been privatized, which could increase self-employment opportunities in sectors such as construction.” (Steinmetz & Wright, 1989)
This offensive proved to be a marginal boost to the nominal and maintained power over the trades, but it could not be sustained for long either. Since the uptick of Reagan’s drug-fueled binge in the late 70s-mid 80s, small employment again resumed a steady decline: first sinking modestly from 12% to 10% of total employment, between 1990 and 2015, largely due to agricultural monopolization. By 2015, the vast majority had no employees under their name, and the majority that did typically held only 1-4 employees.[10] 10 years later in 2025, this number has faltered to further 6%, by far the lowest in American history, and likewise propelled by contracting write-offs.[11] While still numerous, it is rather the spectre of the petit-bourgeoisie and its everpresent culture which haunts American society today.
Interlude: The Petit-Capitalist’s Death Knell
There is nothing as American as noxious petit-capitalism. The relation is baked further into the fabric of the nation than Protestantism, and maintains more support from the public than the military, labor unions, churches or schools.[12] It is the Great Unifier, yet sets in grave debacles every election cycle for the sake of tearing the monoculture apart. All political answers are mere questions of this tendency toward petit worship.
Our collective spirit is one of individual entrepreneurial Passion, and it is a Great Passion, for we have elevated it to an epoch unparalleled by any other settlement, empire or otherwise. Thus, the dispossession of the American petit-bourgeois today is a most gratuitous emblem of bourgeois society. Every cold blooded American fears this transfer. They are always talking and thinking about it, their actions congealed with solace in all political-economic, and spiritual realms. None of this quivering amounts to much, for in their dispossession, a society of small owners, bound together only by this relation, quickly deteriorates toward dissolution. Get to know them well before they pass.
To recalculate the dying dream from the perspective of those at its very cusp, the modern firm entry rate–the propensity of such business entering any physical market–has declined almost 25% since the 1970s, their ability to contract laborers has likewise faltered by roughly 33%, and the overall development of new firms has declined from .022% to .015% (per capita), otherwise outlining a 30% decline in proliferation of new businesses, in physical localities or otherwise completely immaterial.[13] The US Chamber of Commerce notes the declining capabilities of small businesses to break even with inflation and labor costs, and the highest ever proportion of owners who face existential risk over employee healthcare and benefits. [14]
A critical factor is the generational tide of class: that is, of the petit-capitalism in America, it is mostly established by Baby Boomers and Gen X’ers. This makes “common sense”: they simply make the bulk of the age range which they could hope to own. Yet the development is such, that as social dinosaurs, the ones who have yet escaped extinction are finding few remnants of society to take their place. It is not only that over half of small owners are over 55 years old, but that they cannot help but wax poetic as nonexistent young buyers struggle to fill their void, leaving them to operate into old age before closing altogether. [15,16]
Neither retirement nor death a savant, there are few worthy government schemes being cooked out to bail out the dying breeds. The only lasting impression is private equity, which has relieved the small owner of the stress of being a pauper. PE completes the petit liquidation through a lavish buyout plan, which often includes intricate benefits for the workers, and places an end to the hereditary feature of the petit-bourgoise class.[17] As Endnotes puts it in the context of the French student uprising, “There is no longer any possibility of winning as a high school student, a worker, or a university student, when no sectoral improvement of living conditions is possible.”[18] Now, the American petit-bourgeoisie is no revolutionary youth movement, but they are simply the undead: their social reproduction is impossible beyond playing the numbers games, freeing up manual laborers elsewhere to drag them from trade union confines, keeping disposable bodies in circulation for a better price. Where France can no longer produce students to study, we cannot produce business owners to speculate their domain. The petit-bourgeoisie could be gone this century, and such an implication rings our ears. As their thirst for social vengeance accelerates, as they seek a revolt toward the non-mythic times of old, as they radicalize in spite of capital, who will stop the brownshirts?
Communist & Fascist Implications
The “affordability crisis” at hand is not just a cry of the proletariat to maintain itself, but the haunting of the small owning class pushed to a great chasm. Marx argued this chasm pushed the lower-petit bourgeoisie, those that would proletarianize, towards the great arsenal of dispossessed fury. In America and elsewhere, the receptive bourgeoisie has been cool enough to slice this momentum with rhetoric, as long as they pine after America’s colonial elements. For the quarter of this century it has sufficiently worked, as neoliberalism’s empty promises have wrung hollow on the vastness of the population. The rise of Trump became the rise of the dispossessed small owners against the forces of neoliberal cosmopolitanism, much to the rue of Mitt Romney, Barack Obama, and all those who tried to hug the fence. Trump signified the boldness of the dispossessed in overthrowing the capitalist’s own allusions, redefining the trenches in which “politics” and “economics” were fought. It, of course, has not resulted in significant gains for the small owners’ demise, and as such new terrain must be uncovered.
Trump failed to offer significant change, ironically as his reign presided over even steeper ownership decline. In response, it was the democratic Left that first called back the fascist’s corperative system into daily imagination. Bernie Sanders brought with him a slate of Italian-esque collaborationists who have rolled into power. In the late 2010s new progressives took to office, and while destabilized by mass uprisings between 2020-2024, they have weathered the storm and can now look back on these tests with harmonious ease (see for example, AOC’s pivot against “Woke 1.0” and defunding the police).[19] In the muck of Trump’s populism they have boasted new friends, and empowered by these gains they have the excuse to propel even wider packages of peace, collaboration and general welfare. They did this mostly in isolation, as it has taken the Republicans ever more time to solidify a welfare package. Yet Trump recently came up to the task with a $5,000 check, and younger candidates like James Fishback loudly declare an “affordability” counterpart to the nativist rhetoric: this strain argues not just that immigrants have invaded American sanctuary yet again, but that liberalism itself has failed, and all the nation’s inhabitants must collude to answer for inequality. Where once cultural facade was all that was needed, we can finally enlist in a decisive collaborationist program on both sides of the aisle. A national appetite for which was sated with the most recent bout of midterm elections. MAGA has been killed, so that capital may survive.
Regarding the implications of this reformist overlap, there are obvious fissures in American society which prevent their ease of insertion. We observe the ongoing global instability due to the Iran War–and all future American endeavors–as well as inflation at large and the falling rate of profit. As always the culprit is the value-form, and especially labor-value: the average laborer has infamously grown expeditious in its productive nature, notching a 96 point increase in productivity between 1979-2026.[20] Whether a bubble waiting to burst or a genuine productive multiplier, AI and ongoing technological developments ensure increasing unemployment (especially amongst the youth), and a decline of stability in many professions once considered ironclad and respectable, if not as revered as the mythic propertied family man and his corner store. This opens up another question for the lower petit-bourgeoisie and its decline: if not for a steady career or basic means of employment to fall back on for their youth, what is there? Should the slide continue, the State would have to leverage more of its debt for the sake of public housing and grandiose universal income schemes, or run the risk of low level warfare across localities, whether communist or nationalist. American Empire would have to oversee a dramatic, almost impossible shift in its accumulation to pull off such a feat. The last moment such a task was “successfully” taken, as in successfully implemented programs to derail crisis, was 1932, when FDR financed a significant portion of government projects with debt spending and raised taxes, both political and economic lines in the sand. Thus, while the United States does not quite bear a solvency risk compared to the likes of France, even so “affordability” in the vein of property ownership looks steep in stature. They will continue to decline, and likely have diminishing returns once proletarianized. Reagan was the final straw. All this to say that regardless of the way of the alienated State, it cannot turn back history in re-establishing the Small Class.
For the right-nationalists, this is splendid news to a fault. They will continuously, ad nauseum, invoke the State-mandated rights of all minorities as more of their base gets in line with their handouts themselves. As they have been in the midst of doing, they will draw a front that ignites in anger against the State, bolstered by the spokesmanship of new politicians who can pair the lost soul of ownership–affordability–with identitarianism. The break with Hitler is that while both the German and American small owners have overseen much of its own decimation, much of our lebensraum has already been laid to waste. We cannot expend resources West nor East, only in floating territorial claims North which have little social and therefore political appetite.
Our State is compelled by the right-nationalist movement to shrivel inside of itself and cast out the migrants seeking to bolster it, ironically the leading source of the petit-bourgeois reinforcement we see today. This disastrous consequence will not only drive the liberal cities to further disassociation with the national project, but further invoke an economic crisis with a labor shortage. Thus while we can always count on more general erratic behavior from the American military in its conquest, we cannot envision anything beyond higher unemployment, higher youth unemployment, and less and less of the possessed over time. All of which will further struggle to be tamed in yet further climate valorization. This may seem like a continuous climb of the world’s affairs and global issues, but at heart we simply posit that labor productivity and inflationary proceedings have driven America to yet another crisis which its existing political bodies are not in shape to solve. The question of labor and what to do with it will define this century.
We argue from our vantage point that Marx’s defining claim on the lower petit-bourgeoisie, that it would ally with the proletariat after slipping into dispossession, is not an accurate depiction of their nature. Even proletarianized, the petit-bourgeoisie lucky enough to have graced such heights will be found unkind when asked to whittle away their psychology. Even as workers they mime the social function of a small tyrant. During COVID-19 and the great oppression of the petit-bourgeoisie, we saw this with the subsequent putsch on January 6th of 2021. We, as much, saw this in Operation Midway Blitz, for the small owners finally came out of their shell–as did the city government–to re-establish business as usual, not for the immigrant’s benefit but for their further enslavement. The slogan of the movement became that of lost profits and closed storefronts. Thus, the small owner will not go down without a war, and their last battle cry is unlikely to be enjoined with the proletariat as much as the bourgeoisie who haplessly professes to share their interests. So as much as we can celebrate the disintegration of their status, it is a valid concern to hold that petit-bourgeois death is actually another weapon, pointed at the movement to abolish what exists. We should not envelop our struggle with theirs.
The crucifixion of the small owners is complicated by the current generation of “anti-capitalists”, a moment characterized by stark adherence to labor-value, and the lack of a pole which posits an immediate break with commodity production. This generation, for now, is happy to consider small business owners as allies even as the latter declares an assault on the former, and makes excuses for their inability to feed, house, clothe, or provide healthcare for them. This is for one reason: the democratic Left is as sympathetic for America’s non-mythic settler past as the “far-right” fascist-traitor-terrorists. Again, for these ilk the crisis of “affordability” is not just intertwined, but defined by the crisis of ownership. It’s why Mamdani was so hell-bent with these promises and excesses to the small owners week after week, why even the more hawkish figures on this front have sullied away from 2020’s “cultural revolution”, and so on and so on. The famous DSA program merely provides the same ontology as Mussolini’s Doctrine of Fascism.
Even beyond this, the mechanism of ownership and efficiency is ingrained in our consciousness. Land must be mediated by workers’ government or council, property by the laws and rights of the epoch. Communism is mediated by socialism, and socialism by American settler-colonialism and small business terrorism. This is not just a sliding scale back to mediocrity, but to the incineration of the lowly slaves and working population. Those refined by political-economy, socially, mentally, and spiritually, will find no shame in the defense of it as eternal law.
Boldly and proudly, what is the communist’s position on property, other than it should immediately be abolished? We can lay to waste any mass politic so dejected as to sever communism from communisation. A fairly one-pointed program thus is the order of the day: Communism is to communise.
Citations
- Jefferson, T. (n.d.). The Works, Vol. 5 (Correspondence 1786-1789) . Online Library of Liberty. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jefferson-the-works-vol-5-correspondence-1786-1789
- Marx, K. (1867). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume I. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf
- Immigration to the United States, 1851 to 1900 | U.S. History Primary Source Timeline | . Library of Congress. (n.d.). https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-1900/immigration-to-united-states-1851-1900/
- Guelzo, A. (2018). Reconstruction as a Pure Bourgeois Revolution. https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1120&context=cwfac
- Slap, Andrew L. and Frank Towers, eds. Confederate Cities: The Urban South during the Civil War Era. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- Rothman, Joshua D. Review of Divided Mastery: Slave Hiring in the American South. Journal of the Early Republic 25, no. 3 (2005): 510-513. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jer.2005.0064.
- Progressive Era to New Era, 1900 to 1929 | U.S. History Primary Source Timeline | . Library of Congress. (n.d.). https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/progressive-era-to-new-era-1900-1929/
- Germain, E. (1958). Sociology of the American Owning Class. https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1958/xx/mills.htm
- Steinmetz, G., & Wright, E. O. (1989). The Fall and Rise of the Petty Bourgeoisie: Changing Patterns of Self-Employment in the Post-War United States. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2780465
- Self-Employment in the United States. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015). https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/self-employment-in-the-united-states/home.htm#:~:text=In%202015%2C%2015.0%20million%20people%2C,and%20those%20who%20had%20not
- Self-Employed, Total (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate). World Bank Open Data. (n.d.). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.SELF.ZS
- Pew Research Center. (2024, February 1). From Businesses and Banks to Colleges and Churches: Americans’ Views of U.S. Institutions. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/01/from-businesses-and-banks-to-colleges-and-churches-americans-views-of-u-s-institutions/
- Levin, A. G. (2024, October 23). Is U.S. Entrepreneurship Declining? . Library of Congress. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12792
- Amid Rising Uncertainty, Small Businesses Express More Concern About the Economy. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (2026, April 7). https://www.uschamber.com/economy/amid-rising-uncertainty-small-businesses-express-more-concern-about-the-economy
- Business Owners’ Ages: Over Half of U.S. Business Owners Were Age 55 and Over. US Census Bureau. (2020, September 25). https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2020/comm/business-owners-ages.html
- Coughlin, J. (2026, May 5). The Clock No One Set: America’s Small Business Succession Crisis. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/josephcoughlin/2026/05/05/the-clock-no-one-set-americas-small-business-succession-crisis/
- Chen, T.-P. (2024, October 14). Private equity pours millions into hvac, plumbing trades. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A1–A2. https://schoolofskilledtrades.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GZFKTYYdEufNVf4UEAPb-WSJNewsPaper-10-14-2024.pdf.
- Leaving the Contemporary Era. Endnotes. (2026, October 10). https://www.endnotes.org.uk/palabre/leaving-the-contemporary-era
- Abcarian, R. (2026, August 23). Even Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Thinks “Woke 1” Was Crazy. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2026-08-23/even-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-thinks-woke-1-was-crazy
- The Productivity–Pay Gap . Economic Policy Institute. (2026, November 10). https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/

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